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ABSTRACT: For nearly 40 years, since the Supreme Court decision in 
Illinois Brick, federal antitrust law has prevented indirect purchasers 
from complaining of overcharges caused by antitrust violations. The 
Court reasoned that direct purchasers are the best and most motivated 
antitrust plaintiffs. But in its 2013 Italian Colors decision, the Court 
made it extremely difficult for direct purchasers to bring an antitrust 
claim in federal court. In doing so, it undermined the policy rationale for 
Illinois Brick, paving the way for courts to reconsider the ban on 
antitrust enforcement by indirect purchasers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The proper role of private enforcement in antitrust law has long been debated. 
One of the most significant judicial reforms of antitrust law associated with the 
Chicago School was the Supreme Court’s decision to limit standing to direct 
purchasers in Illinois Brick Company v. State of Illinois.2 Although that decision 
has proven controversial, the Illinois Brick doctrine has endured as a principle of 
federal antitrust law for nearly 40 years. 
Whatever the merits of the Illinois Brick decision in 1977, subsequent 
developments have undermined its rationale. In particular, the Supreme Court’s 
2013 decision in American Express v. Italian Colors3 undercuts the fundamental 
premises of the Illinois Brick doctrine. The Illinois Brick majority assumed that 
direct purchasers were the most motivated and the best situated to enforce antitrust 
laws that resulted in supracompetitive prices. But Italian Colors makes it very 
difficult for direct purchasers to enforce antitrust laws in a wide variety of 
circumstances, because the decision allows potential antitrust defendants to use 
arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts to ban antitrust class actions and 
require individual arbitration of antitrust disputes. The result is to deprive 
overcharged direct purchasers of the tools antitrust law offers for effective 
enforcement—class action status, a lengthy statute of limitations, treble damages, 
and, if successful, attorneys’ fees.4 Without effective opportunities for enforcement 
by direct purchasers, the rationale for excluding indirect purchasers from bringing 
antitrust claims collapses. 
Antitrust law is common law and is often based on policy arguments. The 
decision in Illinois Brick is no exception. The Court based its reasoning on its 
assessment of the ability of direct purchasers to enforce antitrust laws effectively. 
After Italian Colors, that is no longer the case. Old doctrines must give way in 
light of legal developments (including later judicial opinions) that change the 
underlying environments and undermine the original policy arguments upon which 
the old common law is based. By eliminating most antitrust enforcement by direct 
purchasers, Italian Colors has paved the way for reconsideration of Illinois Brick.5 
 
        2.  Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737 (1977). .  
 3.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). .  
 4.  15 U.S.C. § 15a (2013). 
 5.  It is possible that the Court didn’t actually mean what it said, and that it just wanted to reduce 
or eliminate private enforcement altogether, as some have suggested doing. See, e.g., William Breit & 
Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble 
Damages, 17 J.L. & Econ. 329 (1974). If you do not think there is a role for private enforcement, you 
might view Italian Colors as a further step towards its elimination and therefore a good thing, no matter 
how disingenuous. We start from the premise that at least some private antitrust enforcement is 
desirable. 
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II. ILLINOIS BRICK: ITS HOLDING AND RATIONALE 
Courts have long been suspicious of competitors as antitrust plaintiffs,6 in part 
because competitor interests do not necessarily align well with consumer interests. 
For example, competitors might object to conduct that benefits consumers, such as 
aggressive price competition.7 Beginning in the 1970s, courts began creating limits 
on competitor standing in an effort to tackle that disconnect.8 
Consumers, by contrast, are, in some sense, the perfect antitrust plaintiffs. 
They are the intended beneficiaries of the competitive markets that antitrust policy 
seeks to encourage; consumers are injured by cartels and other anticompetitive 
conduct, but benefit from aggressive competition on the merits. Accordingly, 
courts have long permitted purchasers to sue to recover overcharges that result 
from cartels,9 though some courts have (incorrectly) questioned customers’ 
standing to enforce the antitrust laws.10 
In Illinois Brick, the plaintiffs were state and local governments who sought 
recovery for overcharges that resulted from a cartel that fixed the prices of concrete 
blocks. But the governments did not buy the blocks directly from the defendants. 
Rather, construction contractors bought the blocks and used them to build 
buildings, which the governments later bought.11 The governments were indirect 
purchasers; their injury came from the fact that the contractors, who paid an 
artificially high price, passed that higher price on to them.12 
The Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers could not recover the 
overcharges that direct purchasers passed on to them.13 Illinois Brick was decided 
on two basic policy considerations. First, the Court concluded that because 
antitrust law permits direct purchasers to recover the entirety of the overcharge 
they faced, without having to deduct price increases they passed on to their own 
customers,14 allowing indirect purchasers to also sue for the same antitrust 
 
 6.  See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (noting that the 
antitrust laws were passed for “the protection of competition, not competitors”). 
 7.  See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 8.  See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110–13 (1986); Associated 
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529–33, 538–46 
(1983); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473–78 (1982); Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 
489. .  
 9.  Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487–88 (1968).  
 10.  See, e.g., Ritz Camera & Image, L.L.C. v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(reaffirming the ability of direct purchasers to bring antitrust cases over claims that they lacked 
standing); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 688 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). See 
generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process Litigation, 13 SW. J.L. & 
TRADE AMS. 281 (2007). 
 11.  Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726–29 (1977). 
 12.  Id. at 727. 
 13.  Id. at 728–29, 736. 
 14.  The Supreme Court rejected the so-called pass-on defense in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
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violation would create a double recovery.15 The Court considered reversing the 
rule allowing direct purchasers to recover the entire overcharge without deduction, 
but rejected that argument because of its second conclusion: that direct purchasers 
were the best positioned to enforce antitrust law.16 The Court interpreted its prior 
decision to reject a passing-on defense to antitrust claims to support the proposition 
“that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full 
recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every 
plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could 
show was absorbed by it.”17 Further, the majority concluded that denying standing 
to indirect purchasers was more consistent with “the legislative purpose in creating 
a group of ‘private attorneys general’ to enforce the antitrust laws” because direct 
purchasers could sue for “the full extent of the overcharge paid by them [without 
having] to apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of 
it.”18 The Court also felt that direct purchase overcharges were easier to measure 
than pass-throughs, particularly if courts had to allocate the injury between the 
direct and indirect purchasers.19 
The dissent worried that indirect purchasers would be short-changed.20 The 
majority responded that allowing direct purchasers to recover the entirety of the 
overcharge would not only be simpler to calculate, but would also promote more 
vigorous antitrust enforcement by centralizing the incentive to sue in one party 
who could recover all the losses.21 In short, Illinois Brick reflected an economic 
conclusion that one, but only one, overcharged purchaser in the downstream chain 
should be entitled to sue, and that for various reasons the simplest and most 
effective solution was for the direct purchaser to be that one purchaser–plaintiff.22 
The Illinois Brick ruling proved controversial. Some commentators decried 
it;23 others defended it.24 The leading antitrust treatise expresses doubt about the 
wisdom of the doctrine: 
 
 15.  Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730. 
 16.  Id. at 745–47. 
 17.  Id. at 735. 
 18.  Id. at 746.  
 19.  Id. at 741–43.  
 20.  Id. at 748 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 21.  Id. at 745–46. 
 22.  Exceptions exist, such as cost-plus contracts. See id. at 736 (“In [a cost-plus contract] 
situation, the [direct] purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result of attempting to 
pass on the overcharge, because its customer is committed to buying a fixed quantity regardless of 
price.”). See also Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History—What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust 
Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 379, 391 (2004) 
(“Indirect purchasers should have standing to sue, but under procedural rules that encourage or even 
mandate consolidation of their claims with those of direct purchasers.” (citing Donald I. Baker, 
Federalism and Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois Brick Road, ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 2002, 
at 14 [hereinafter Baker, Federalism and Futility])). But see Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 
199, 217–18 (1990) (rejecting application of cost-plus exception). 
 23.  See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 17 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 18 (2004); Andrew I. Gavil, Thinking Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal 
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 The obvious difficulty with denying damages for consumers buying 
from an intermediary is that they are injured, often more than the 
intermediary, who may also be injured but for whom recovery of the 
entire overcharge is typically a windfall. Thus the indirect purchaser rule 
greatly overcompensates intermediaries and greatly undercompensate[s] 
consumers in the name of efficiency in the administration of the antitrust 
laws. 
. . . . 
[Section 4] of the Clayton Act awards damages to the person who is 
“injured,” and Illinois Brick frequently gives the award to the wrong 
person.25 
Thirty-five states have rejected the doctrine, permitting antitrust enforcement by 
indirect purchasers under their state antitrust laws.26 As a result, judges and 
scholars have developed a sophisticated body of law and economic thought on the 
problem of computing downstream overcharges, though that law has developed 
primarily in state, rather than federal, antitrust cases.27 
Furthermore, in the years that followed, the Court put substantial constraints 
on the ability of competitors to bring private antitrust suits. For example, the Court 
 
for Reform, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 171 (2009); J. Thomas Prud’homme, Jr. & Ellen S. Cooper, One 
More Challenge for the AMC: Repairing the Legacy of Illinois Brick, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 683–84 
(2006); cf. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern 
Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (arguing that Illinois Brick should be 
retained but limited). 
 24.  See, e.g., Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A 
Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 84 (2007); Gregory J. 
Werden & Marius Schwartz, Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations—An Economic 
Analysis, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 629, 637–38 (1984). 
 25.  2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR & CHRISTINE PIETTE 
DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 
346k at 189, 197 (3d ed. 2007); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: 
PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 74–76 (2005) (criticizing Illinois Brick); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Commentary, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1990).  
 26.  See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 269 (2007) 
[hereinafter AMC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_ 
recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf. For a summary of approaches taken by states that have repealed 
Illinois Brick, see Gale Price, One Short of a Load: Why an Illinois Brick Repealer Will Increase Private 
Antitrust Enforcement in Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 399, 406–09 (2013). The Supreme Court held in 
California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), that those state laws were not preempted by the 
federal rule in Illinois Brick. For a discussion of states to repeal Illinois Brick, see, for example, 
Baker, Federalism and Futility, supra note 21, at 17–18; Ronald W. Davis, Indirect Purchaser Litigation: 
ARC America’s Chickens Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 391–93 
(1997); Matthew M. Duffy, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding Exceptions to the 
Indirect Purchaser Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1709, 1710 (2012); William H. Page, The Limits of 
State Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class Certification in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1–
6 (1999). 
 27.  AREEDA ET AL., supra note 24, at ¶ 396 (discussing the computation of overcharges in 
indirect purchaser cases, and rejecting the claim that it is too difficult). 
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developed a new doctrine, “antitrust injury,” which created higher standing hurdles 
in antitrust than in other private law doctrines.28 Government enforcement has also 
declined substantially during the period since Illinois Brick.29 Barriers to 
competitor standing increase the importance of purchaser standing to bring 
antitrust claims.30 
As a result of the Illinois Brick decision and the Court’s antitrust injury cases, 
for nearly 40 years, enforcement of the Sherman Act has been the province of 
government agencies, some competitors, and purchasers—but only the first, direct 
purchaser. While direct purchasers are sometimes consumers, they are often 
corporate intermediaries. For example, the direct purchasers of Microsoft 
Windows are usually computer manufacturers, not the people who actually use the 
software.31 Similarly, the direct purchasers of pharmaceuticals are drugstores, not 
patients.32 As a result, in many cases, antitrust relies on corporate proxies to 
represent consumer interests. 
Reliance on corporate proxies had the potential to work, at least at first. An 
early empirical study suggested that the central premise of the Court’s logic—that 
direct purchasers would be well motivated to sue—was borne out in fact.33 But 
subsequent changes in antitrust doctrine and practice require reevaluation of the 
premise that direct purchasers can, and will, litigate antitrust claims, and that they 
can do so better than indirect purchasers. 
III. ANTITRUST ARBITRATION AT THE DAWN OF ILLINOIS BRICK 
Illinois Brick is a product of its time. The majority based its opinion on 
several assumptions and policy judgments that, even if true in 1977, were not 
static. Most significantly for our purposes, the Court penned Illinois Brick at a time 
 
 28.  See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986); Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983); Blue Shield of 
Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476–77 (1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 
U.S. 477, 489 (1977). But see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 
1387–88 (2014) (rejecting the antitrust standing test as too restrictive for false advertising cases). 
 29.  See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, The Decline of Antitrust Enforcement, 19 Rev. Indus. Org. 49, 49 
(2001). 
 30.  Although awarding antitrust damages to competitors does not compensate consumer victims 
of antitrust violations, competitor-initiated antitrust litigation can reduce the expected profitability of 
antitrust violations and, thus, increase deterrence, which ultimately benefits consumers. 
 31.  In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710 (D. Md. 2001), 
supplemented, No. MDL-1332, 2001 WL 137254 (D. Md. Feb. 15, 2001), aff’d sub nom. Kloth v. 
Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Plaintiffs’ supra-competitive price claims arise, very 
simply, from the assertion that Microsoft obtained monopoly profits from its sales to OEMs, who 
passed on these illegal overcharges to plaintiffs. This is the Illinois Brick paradigm, and plaintiffs’ 
claims for supra-competitive prices are barred.”); see also Mark v. Microsoft Corp. (In re Microsoft 
Corp. Antitrust Litig.), 401 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463 (D. Md. 2005) (following Illinois Brick in decision to 
bar indirect purchasers from bringing state claims against Microsoft). 
 32.  See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606–07 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 33.  See Werden & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 667. 
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when pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims were not enforceable. 
The legal landscape regarding antitrust arbitration has changed considerably in the 
intervening years. 
The federal government’s validation of private arbitration began in 1925 
when Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).34 Section 2 of the 
FAA provides that if a commercial contract contains an agreement to settle 
controversies that arise from the contract through private arbitration, the promise to 
arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”35 The FAA instructed 
federal courts to enforce agreements between firms to settle their commercial 
disputes through binding arbitration instead of going to court. 
Although Congress passed the FAA in 1925,36 federal courts did not 
meaningfully address the issue of the arbitrability of antitrust claims until the 
1960s. In 1968, the Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. 
Maguire & Co. became the first court of appeals to hold that antitrust claims were 
not subject to arbitration.37 The Second Circuit articulated four rationales for 
concluding that the FAA did not apply to antitrust claims: 
(1) deference to private arbitration agreements could lessen the 
plaintiffs’ incentive to pursue antitrust actions, weakening the use of 
“private attorneys general” as a foundation of Sherman Act enforcement; 
(2) arbitration clauses often result from adhesion contracts, and Congress 
intended that these matters be heard in the courts; (3) arbitrators may be 
incompetent to comprehend complex antitrust issues; and (4) arbitrators 
may be biased business people unable to reach fair outcomes.38 
The American Safety rationale proved persuasive across the circuits, as courts 
relied on American Safety to hold that antitrust claims were not subject to 
 
 34.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–200 (2013); Bellevue Drug Co. v. Caremarks PCS (In re Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers Antitrust Litig.), 700 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to 
counteract ‘the traditional judicial hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.’” (quoting 
Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003))). 
 35.  9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 36.  John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced 
Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 227 (1986). 
 37.  Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., Inc., 391 F.2d 821, 827–28 (2d Cir. 1968); 
Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and Hazards for 
Corporate Counsel, 48 BUS. LAW 395, 402 (1993). 
 38.  Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration, 81 TUL. L. 
REV. 395, 409 (2006); see also Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441–42 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In 
American Safety, the Second Circuit held that antitrust claims cannot be arbitrated because of the public 
interest in enforcing antitrust laws, the potential bias and limited expertise of arbitrators, the complexity 
of antitrust law, and the procedural differences between trials and arbitrations.” (citing Am. Safety 
Equip. Corp., 391 F.2d at 826–27)); Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the 
Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled 
Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 518 (2009) (reciting the four rationales in 
another fashion). 
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arbitration.39 In fact, every court of appeals that considered the issue uniformly 
followed American Safety and held that antitrust claims were inappropriate for 
arbitration.40 
By 1977, the year that Illinois Brick was decided, the Supreme Court had 
neither addressed the issue of antitrust arbitration nor questioned the validity of 
American Safety and its progeny. Until the mid-1980s, the American Safety rule 
prohibiting arbitration of antitrust claims was well established, widespread, and not 
particularly controversial. Thus, at the time of the Illinois Brick decision, antitrust 
arbitration was not a possibility. Private antitrust claims were litigated, not shunted 
off to private arbitration panels pursuant to pre-agreed-upon arbitration clauses. 
The Illinois Brick Court assumed that direct purchasers had an unhampered ability 
to bring antitrust claims in federal court. That assumption would not survive the 
following decade. 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST ARBITRATION IN THE POST-ILLINOIS BRICK 
ERA 
The American Safety doctrine began to erode in the 1980s, as the Supreme 
Court interpreted the FAA as creating a heavy presumption in favor of arbitration 
for all claims.41 The Supreme Court began to dislodge the American Safety 
doctrine when it considered whether Sherman Act claims could be decided by 
international arbitration tribunals in other countries. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler–Plymouth Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether the 
American Safety rule should apply to the international arbitration of antitrust 
claims.42 
The Court began by noting that it was primarily concerned with whether an 
American court should allow private parties to an international transaction—
pursuant to an arbitration clause in their commercial contract—to submit an 
 
 39.  See, e.g., Lake Commc’ns, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1984); Lee v. 
Ply*Gem Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1274–75 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Cont’l 
Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117–19 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(“[A]ntitrust claims are not appropriate subjects of arbitration.”); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 
Inc., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215–16 (2d Cir. 1972); Helfenbein v. Int’l Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070–71 
(8th Cir. 1971); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980, 983–84 (9th Cir. 1970); 
A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715–16 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Aimcee 
Wholesale Corp., 237 N.E.2d 223, 224–27 (N.Y. 1968). 
 40.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1985). 
 41.  See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”); id. at 24–25 (noting that “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether 
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, 
or a like defense to arbitrability”).  
 42.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 632–35. 
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antitrust dispute to an international tribunal instead of a federal district court.43 
When analyzing the arbitrability of the antitrust claims at issue, the Mitsubishi 
Court emphasized the international context of the dispute, noting that 
[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign 
and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the 
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming 
that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.44 
In reaching its result, the Court critiqued each rationale that the Second 
Circuit used to render antitrust claims non-arbitrable in American Safety.45 The 
Supreme Court also rejected any “presumption against arbitration of statutory 
claims.”46 The Court, however, did not explicitly overrule the American Safety 
rule. Instead, it distinguished American Safety as not involving international 
transactions and found “it unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the American 
Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic 
transactions.”47 
Although the Mitsubishi Court explicitly declined to reverse American Safety 
and to apply its opinion to domestic antitrust claims, some lower courts 
nevertheless interpreted Mitsubishi as making all antitrust claims arbitrable.48 For 
 
 43.  Id. at 624 (“We granted certiorari primarily to consider whether an American court should 
enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an 
international transaction.”). 
 44.  Id. at 629. 
 45.  The Mitsubishi Court noted: 
At the outset, we confess to some skepticism of certain aspects of the American Safety 
doctrine. . . . The mere appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant 
invalidation of the selected forum on the undemonstrated assumption that the arbitration 
clause is tainted. . . . Next, potential complexity should not suffice to ward off 
arbitration. . . . [W]e also reject the proposition that an arbitration panel will pose too 
great a danger of innate hostility to the constraints on business conduct that antitrust law 
imposes. . . . We are left, then, with the core of the American Safety doctrine—the 
fundamental importance to American democratic capitalism of the regime of the antitrust 
laws. . . . The importance of the private damages remedy, however, does not compel the 
conclusion that it may not be sought outside an American court. 
Id. at 632–36. 
 46.  Id. at 625. 
 47.  Id. at 629.  
 48.  In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Although the Supreme 
Court has yet to directly consider the arbitrability of domestic antitrust claims, the Court’s analysis of 
the question in Mitsubishi is equally applicable to domestic antitrust claims . . . . We therefore have no 
difficulty concluding that domestic antitrust claims, as a class, are suitable for arbitration.”); DJ Mfg. 
Corp. v. Tex-Shield, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 140, 145 (D.P.R. 1998) (“Even though the Court did not address 
the issue of arbitrability of antitrust issues in the domestic arena, it seriously undermined the rationale 
espoused by the Second Circuit in American Safety regarding the propriety of arbitration of antitrust 
issues in general.”); see also Baker & Stabile, supra note 36, at 406 (“Although the Court’s holding in 
Mitsubishi is limited to the international arena, its logic is not.”). 
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example, the Ninth Circuit treated the Mitsubishi “Court’s meticulous step-by-step 
disembowelment of the American Safety doctrine” as “effectively overrul[ing] 
American Safety and its progeny.”49 Other circuits followed suit and began to 
revisit their rules against allowing domestic antitrust claims to be arbitrated, 
ultimately holding that, despite the fact that Mitsubishi involved international 
arbitration, the opinion required that domestic antitrust lawsuits be subject to 
arbitration.50 
The combination of Congress making arbitration clauses enforceable and 
federal courts holding that antitrust claims were arbitrable led many potential 
antitrust defendants to engage in a two-pronged strategy to minimize or avoid 
antitrust liability. First, many businesses imposed arbitration agreements on their 
distributors and customers.51 Second, they structured their arbitration clauses to 
 
 49.  Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 50.  See, e.g., Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6, 
11 (1st Cir. 2001) (expressly rejecting American Safety in view of Mitsubishi); Kotam Elecs., Inc. v. 
JBL Consumer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 724, 728 (11th Cir. 1996) (“In light of Mitsubishi and its 
progeny . . . we hold that . . . arbitration agreements concerning domestic antitrust claims are 
enforceable.”); see also HCI Techs., Inc. v. Avaya, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“A 
review of subsequent case law reveals that while the grim reaper may not yet have found American 
Safety’s address, he is certainly in the neighborhood.”); Tex-Shield, Inc., 998 F. Supp. at 145 (“[W]e 
also hold that domestic antitrust disputes . . . are arbitrable.”); Hunt v. Up N. Plastics, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 
1046, 1049–50 (D. Minn. 1997) (finding the same); Acquaire v. Can. Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 
837 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding the same); Syscomm Int’l Corp. v. Synoptics Commc’ns, Inc., 856 F. 
Supp. 135, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“While American Safety has not been explicitly overruled, this Court 
believes that . . . domestic antitrust claims are arbitrable.”); Hough v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he reasoning of Mitsubishi should apply with 
equal force to domestic claims.”), aff’d, 946 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1991); W. Int’l Media Corp. v. Johnson, 
754 F. Supp. 871, 873–74 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“Although the Court supported its rejection of some of 
these concerns on grounds tied to the principles involved in international commercial transactions, the 
Court’s reliance on arbitration principles and the legislative histories of antitrust provisions suggests 
that the result arrived at in Mitsubishi would be forthcoming in the domestic situation.”). 
 51.  See Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In the years since 
Congress adopted the FAA, clauses containing class-arbitration waivers have become ubiquitous in 
contracts involving products and services distributed or supplied on a mass basis, such as contracts 
providing for cell phone service, credit cards, and cable service.”); Jason W. Burge & Lara K. Richards, 
A Compelling Case for Streamlining Venue of Actions to Enjoin Arbitration, 88 TUL. L. REV. 773, 774 
(2014) (“Arbitration agreements have become ‘ubiquitous in American society.’ If you have signed a 
contract for a cell phone, bought stock through a brokerage account, or accepted new employment, 
chances are you have signed a contract with an arbitration clause.”); Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Stuck in a 
Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the Problems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the 
Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1084 (2009) (“The benefits that accrue to businesses that 
utilize mandatory-binding-arbitration clauses in consumer contracts help explain why these clauses 
have become so ubiquitous. As of 2002, over 1000 companies included mandatory binding arbitration 
in routine sales transactions.”); Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
1767, 1777 (2014) (“As the enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements have increased, 
arbitration has become ubiquitous across disparate areas of the law.”); Judith Resnik, Comment, 
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 121–22 (2011). But cf. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” 
Arbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Conception and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
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make antitrust claims less lucrative and harder to bring. For example, some 
arbitration clauses attempt to preclude antitrust plaintiffs from recovering the treble 
damages mandated by federal antitrust law. So far, courts have rejected such 
attempts.52 Courts have, however, been more amenable to defendants’ attempts to 
use arbitration clauses in order to shorten the Clayton Act’s four-year statute of 
limitations53 and to eliminate the antitrust provision that allows a successful 
plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees.54 
Most controversially, many arbitration clauses prohibit class action 
litigation.55 While these class action waivers have been widely criticized by 
scholars, judges, and legislators,56 the Supreme Court has been decidedly less 
wary. When, for example, the California Supreme Court condemned class action 
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable,57 the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, reversed the California rule.58 The Court 
reasoned that the FAA preempted state attempts to invalidate class action waivers 
contained in arbitration clauses.59 Although Concepcion involved state-based 
consumer law, the decision seemed to endorse class action waivers more broadly.60 
In addition to making it more difficult for antitrust plaintiffs to bring class 
action litigation in federal court, the Supreme Court, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp., also made it easier for antitrust defendants to 
evade class-wide arbitration.61 Because arbitration clauses now routinely prohibit 
 
955 (2014) (finding that companies have been slower to adopt arbitration clauses in franchise contracts 
than others have predicted). 
 52.  Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 53.  In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d at 288–89. 
 54.  See, e.g., James C. Justice Cos., Inc. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923, 
at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (The plaintiff “has offered no evidence that paying its own attorney’s 
fees and costs in arbitration would prevent it from effectively vindicating its rights under the Sherman 
Act. Therefore, Court cannot conclude that the Dealership Agreement’s limitation on attorney’s fees 
and costs is inconsistent with the policies of the Sherman Act.”); cf. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 52–53 
(striking the anti-fee provision in an arbitration clause because “the ban on the recovery of attorney’s 
fees and costs in the arbitration agreements would burden Plaintiffs here with prohibitive arbitration 
costs, preventing Plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights in arbitration”). 
 55.  See Homa, 494 F. App’x at 197 (“In the years since Congress adopted the FAA, clauses 
containing class-arbitration waivers have become ubiquitous in contracts involving products and 
services distributed or supplied on a mass basis, such as contracts providing for cell phone service, 
credit cards, and cable service.”). 
 56.  See, e.g., Davis v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 299 F. App’x 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
class action waiver provision is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.”); Myriam Gilles 
& Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 
U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 640–52 (2012). 
 57.  See Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005). 
 58.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 
90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012) (“In the near future, we can expect that even more companies will 
impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate themselves from class actions because 
Concepcion has changed the calculus.”). 
 61.  Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010). 
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both class actions and class arbitration, victims of antitrust violations are often 
prevented from bringing any collective action. Indeed, some arbitration clauses 
prevented antitrust plaintiffs from coordinating in any fashion, including sharing 
the costs of developing common factual and economic data.62 
After Concepcion and Stolt–Nielsen, however, antitrust plaintiffs still had 
another argument against class-action waivers in arbitration agreements: the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine. In making antitrust claims arbitrable, the 
Mitsubishi Court concluded that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively 
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will 
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”63 This language 
embodies the Effective Vindication Doctrine, which provides that “arbitration of 
the claim will not be compelled if the prospective litigant cannot effectively 
vindicate his statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”64 The doctrine was designed to 
protect the statutory rights of antitrust victims. For example, courts have invoked 
the Effective Vindication Doctrine to invalidate the detrebling provisions 
embedded in arbitration clauses.65 
In 2012, the Second Circuit applied the Effective Vindication Doctrine to 
arbitration clauses that forbid class action litigation and classwide arbitration. In In 
re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, a group of merchants entered into 
contracts with American Express that contained arbitration clauses, which 
provided that “[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated 
on a class action basis . . . .”66 Despite signing these class action waivers, the 
merchants filed an antitrust class action in federal court. The merchants argued that 
because the necessary expert witnesses were so expensive, and because there was 
so little money at stake for any one merchant, compelling the merchants to 
individually arbitrate would prevent them from effectively vindicating their rights 
to an antitrust remedy; a class action represented the only cost-effective form of 
adjudication. After the district court granted American Express’ motion to dismiss 
based on the arbitration clause, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that “the 
plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that the class action waiver provision at 
issue should not be enforced because enforcement of the clause would effectively 
 
 62.  See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“[The arbitration agreement’s] confidentiality provision prevents Italian Colors from 
informally arranging with other merchants to produce a common expert report. . . . In short, the 
agreement as applied in this case cuts off not just class arbitration, but any avenue for sharing, shifting, 
or shrinking necessary costs.”). 
 63.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
 64.  In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282–83 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Green Tree 
Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)); see also Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2314 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The Effective Vindication Doctrine provides that a]n arbitration clause will 
not be enforced if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves 
that result.”). 
 65.  Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 37, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2006) (invoking Mitsubishi to 
disapprove such waivers). 
 66.  In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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preclude any action seeking to vindicate the statutory rights asserted by the 
plaintiffs.”67 The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit decision in light of its 
opinion in Concepcion, which held that the FAA preempted California’s rule 
against class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts.68 On remand, the Second 
Circuit again held that the Effective Vindication Doctrine precluded mandatory 
individual arbitration of the merchants’ claims. 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Supreme Court 
again considered whether the Effective Vindication Doctrine excused the 
merchants from the mandatory arbitration clause.69 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia applied the doctrine to the facts of Italian Colors. He noted the 
merchants’ evidence “from an economist who estimated that the cost of an expert 
analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be ‘at least several hundred 
thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,’ while the maximum recovery for 
an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.”70 Scalia 
asserted that what mattered was the right to pursue an antitrust remedy, not 
whether the merchants could exercise that right economically; he proclaimed that 
“the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy 
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”71 As 
applied, this meant “a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under 
the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a 
federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”72 Consequently, the Court 
held that potential defendants can use arbitration clauses to prevent class actions, 
even when a class action is the only way to effectively vindicate the right to an 
antitrust remedy.73 According to Justice Scalia, “the antitrust laws do not guarantee 
an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”74 
In the aftermath of Italian Colors, potential antitrust defendants have every 
incentive to include class action waivers in their mandatory arbitration clauses.75  
 
 67.  In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (Mem). 
 68.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). Although Concepcion 
seemed to reject the effective vindication doctrine in context of state claims, the case “was decided on 
preemption grounds . . . and the Supreme Court had no occasion in that case to decide whether access to 
class proceedings was necessary for the effective vindication of a federal statutory right.” Ellen 
Meriwether, Class Action Waiver and the Effective Vindication Doctrine at the Antitrust/Arbitration 
Crossroads, 26 ANTITRUST 67, 67 (2012); cf. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 
2319–20 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“AT&T Mobility was not—and could not have been—about the 
effective-vindication rule.”). 
 69.  Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2307. 
 70.  Id. at 2308 (citation omitted). 
 71.  Id. at 2311. 
 72.  See id. at 2307. 
 73.  Id. at 2311 (discussing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)). 
 74.  Id. at 2309. 
 75.  See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement By 
Replacing It With Ineffective Forms of Arbitration 8 (Working Paper, 2015) (on file with authors) 
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And they are increasingly doing so—the number of large companies that include 
such waivers has more than doubled since Conception and Italian Colors.76 The 
proliferation of arbitration clauses, combined with class action waivers, 
fundamentally changes the legal environment from the one that existed during the 
mid-1970s when the Court decided Illinois Brick. The Illinois Brick majority 
assumed that antitrust claims would be litigated, not arbitrated, and that they could 
be litigated as class actions. 
V. ITALIAN COLORS UNDERMINES THE RATIONALE OF ILLINOIS BRICK 
Illinois Brick was based on two central premises. First, the Court assumed that 
direct purchasers were the best private antitrust plaintiffs.77 Unlike competitors, 
purchasers have incentives that are generally aligned with the public interest in a 
competitive market. And among purchasers, the Court reasoned that direct 
purchasers have more concentrated interests than ultimate consumers, so they may 
be more likely to sue—and to hire better lawyers when they do. The calculation of 
damages is also simpler when only one transaction has occurred than when courts 
have to trace the pass-through of the overcharge.78 
Second, the Illinois Brick Court worried about the risk of double 
compensation if it permitted indirect purchasers to sue as well as direct purchasers. 
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., a 1968 case, the Court 
held that an antitrust defendant could not claim a deduction for a price overcharge 
that the direct purchaser passed through to downstream purchasers.79 Because of 
that decision, nine years later in Illinois Brick, the Court worried that allowing both 
the direct and the downstream purchaser to sue would result in a double recovery.80 
While antitrust law does not always object to multiple recoveries—the Clayton Act 
awards treble damages in order to deter undetected antitrust violations81—the 
 
(“Given the Italian Colors decision, it is hard to see why all businesses would not at least insert 
arbitration clauses into their contracts that preclude class arbitration.”). 
 76.  See, e.g., Jeremy B. Merrill, One-Third of Top Websites Restrict Customers’ Right to Sue, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/upshot/one-third-of-top-websites-
restrict-customers-right-to-sue.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 (noting that one-third of customer-facing 
web sites ban class actions by a “browsewrap” contract and that the number of contracts that ban class 
actions across all companies has “more than doubled” since the Court made them legal). For instances of 
courts applying arbitration to bar class antitrust claims, see, for example, In re Polyurethane Foam 
Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 5365448 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2014) (“reluctantly” granting motion to compel 
arbitration because of Italian Colors); Paduano v. Express Scripts, 2014 WL 54313210 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 
27, 2014) (granting motion to compel arbitration under an agreement that banned antitrust class 
arbitrations). 
 77.  See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.  
 78.  Cf. Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758 (2010) (refusing to allow defendants to assert a 
pass-through defense). 
 79.  Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). 
 80.  Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977). 
 81.  15 U.S.C. § 15a (2013); see also Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical 
and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269 (2013); cf. 
Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 
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Court was clearly concerned by the prospect that the defendant would have to pay 
damages from the same sale to two or more plaintiffs.82 
Both pillars of the Illinois Brick argument collapse after Italian Colors. As 
antitrust arbitration agreements become more common in sales contracts, many 
direct purchasers are no longer able to file antitrust suits challenging overcharges. 
They can theoretically arbitrate those disputes, but in doing so they will not 
necessarily get the advantages antitrust law consciously offers to induce suit: treble 
damages and attorneys’ fees.83 In addition, because arbitration proceedings are 
almost always confidential,84 the world will not benefit from learning about the 
antitrust violation and subsequent plaintiffs will not benefit from collateral 
estoppel.85 
Further, because the Supreme Court has allowed arbitration agreements to 
forbid class actions,86 antitrust enforcement will be particularly ineffective in 
circumstances in which the direct purchases involve a large group of small-value 
transactions. The named plaintiff in Italian Colors, for instance, had only a small 
amount personally at stake.87 A class of such plaintiffs may well have an incentive 
to sue, but individuals certainly will not arbitrate when the expected costs of 
arbitration exceed the maximum individual recovery. Even if the individual had the 
desire, no rational attorney would take the case. 
The use of arbitration clauses to impede class action litigation is particularly 
disruptive in the context of antitrust violations, which often impose relatively low 
costs on a relatively large group of victims. This is precisely the scenario for which 
class actions were designed. Consequently, federal judges have noted that “the 
Supreme Court has long recognized that class actions serve a valuable role in the 
enforcement of antitrust laws.”88 In particular, retailer class actions—such as the 
 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1009–10 (2008) (explaining how courts interfere with the treble damages 
regime). 
 82.  Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730–31. 
 83.  Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2006), held that restrictions on treble 
damages in antitrust arbitration agreements were unenforceable. But it is not clear that that ruling will 
survive American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–11 (2013).  
 84.  See, e.g., Global Reinsurance Corp.-U.S. Branch v. Argonaut Ins. Co., Nos. 07 Civ. 
8196(PKC), 07 Civ. 8350(PKC), 2008 WL 1805459, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2008) (“The federal 
policy in favor of arbitration is promoted by permitting one of the principle [sic] advantages of 
arbitration—confidentiality—to be achieved.”). 
 85.  Arbitration normally does not create precedent that binds the participants in subsequent 
litigation with non-parties. See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999). But some 
courts have applied collateral estoppel to antitrust arbitrations. See Global Live Events v. Ja–Tail 
Enters., LLC, No. CV 13-8293 SVW, 2014 WL 1830998, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2014). 
 86.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011) (holding that classes 
are not permitted to arbitrate antitrust disputes because class action procedure interferes with the 
operation of arbitration). Italian Colors extended that conclusion even to cases when it was clear that it 
was infeasible to bring a case except as a class action. 
 87.  Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that at most Italian 
Colors could have recovered less than $40,000, far less than it costs to litigate a rule of reason antitrust 
case). 
 88.  In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
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one that Italian Colors put an effective end to—have been historically important.89 
Because of the proliferation of arbitration clauses, direct purchasers in a post-
Italian Colors world are no longer the most obvious plaintiffs. If direct purchasers 
are effectively prevented from securing full compensation for the antitrust injuries, 
the possibility of damages being passed on to indirect purchasers is eliminated. In 
the aftermath of Italian Colors, indirect purchasers may be in a better position to 
hold antitrust violators accountable because they are less likely to be bound by an 
arbitration clause, which requires consent.90 Consequently, a class of indirect 
purchasers is likely to be a better antitrust plaintiff than an individual direct 
purchaser forced to arbitrate her antitrust dispute. This undermines one of the key 
assumptions upon which Illinois Brick is based. 
Because direct purchasers are less likely to bring claims after Italian Colors, 
the Illinois Brick Court’s worry about double compensation is also substantially 
reduced. If a direct purchaser is subject to an arbitration agreement and is unlikely 
to bring a claim, there is little risk of double compensation. Moreover, excessive 
compensation is particularly unlikely in the context of class actions because 
successful participants in antitrust class actions generally receive “less than single 
damages.”91 Thus, even if direct purchasers and indirect purchasers were to bring 
parallel class actions for the same antitrust violation, the losing defendant is likely 
to pay out less than the treble damages mandated by antitrust law. Further, the 
calculation of injury may be substantially simpler in cases in which the direct 
purchaser cannot practically sue and therefore overcharges need not be 
apportioned. Consequently, the more serious risk in this new antitrust world is 
undercompensation and underdeterrence. 
 
 89.  See, e.g., LLOYD CONSTANTINE, PRICELESS: THE CASE THAT BROUGHT DOWN THE 
VISA/MASTERCARD BANK CARTEL (2013). 
 90.  Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (“[T]he FAA 
imposes certain rules of fundamental importance, including the basic precept that arbitration ‘is a matter 
of consent, not coercion.’” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))). In a world in which courts seem to enforce anything one party labels as a 
contract, whether or not it is signed or even visible to the “agreeing” party, see generally NANCY S. 
KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006), there is 
some risk that even indirect purchasers in some industries like software will be bound to these 
arbitration agreements as well. That is a limitation on our proposal. But it will not make it completely 
ineffective. And we think the right solution is for courts to impose some reasonable limits on the ability 
to compel arbitration through such form contracts, as some courts have done. For an example of an 
electronic arbitration clause found unconscionable, see Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 
1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005). But see Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 117–19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (enforcing an 
arbitration clause included in an online “Terms and Conditions of Sale” hyperlink). One study showed 
that courts found arbitration clauses unconscionable at twice the rate they found other provisions 
unconscionable. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004). 
 91.  See John M. Connor, Price-Fixing Overcharges: Revised 3rd Edition 1 (Am. Antitrust Inst., 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2400780 (finding after 
exhaustive study that “[h]istorical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to 
be too low”); Leslie, supra note 80, at 1040.  
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In short, at least based on the Court’s stated rationale, Illinois Brick would 
have come out the other way in today’s world—a world in which antitrust 
arbitration agreements with direct purchasers are increasingly common and class 
actions by direct purchasers correspondingly more difficult. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST LAW 
In the 1970s, antitrust scholars worried that there was too much antitrust 
enforcement.92 Illinois Brick and the antitrust injury doctrine were judicial 
responses to that worry. While other decisions limited the substantive reach of 
antitrust law, those cases limited the circumstances under which private parties 
could enforce that substantive law. 
The world has changed. In a series of cases over the past three decades, the 
Supreme Court has dramatically reduced the substantive reach of antitrust law.93 
Government enforcement has also declined.94 And Italian Colors is likely to make 
private enforcement infeasible for the single best class of private plaintiffs: direct 
purchasers. 
In the wake of Italian Colors, the more reasonable worry is that antitrust 
violations will go unremedied because the best plaintiff is likely to be foreclosed 
from enforcing the law by a standard-form contract. And if direct purchasers are 
unavailable as plaintiffs, indirect purchasers will often be a better substitute than 
competitors. Italian Colors and Illinois Brick together operate to preclude even 
indisputably valid antitrust claims; the latter eliminates indirect purchasers as 
plaintiffs, while the former hampers the ability of direct purchasers to sue. In short, 
leaving politics aside, had the Court that wrote Illinois Brick confronted the facts 
of antitrust as it now exists, it would have come to a very different conclusion 
about the suitability of indirect purchasers as plaintiffs. 
The solution is correspondingly simple: Illinois Brick should be overruled. It 
is based on a set of judgments about antitrust law that are obsolete. If the Supreme 
Court is unwilling to overrule Illinois Brick, Congress and the remaining state 
 
 92.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).  
 93.  See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 685, 700–01 (2009). 
Judge Easterbrook could speak in 1984 of the asymmetry between false positives and 
false negatives, but the antitrust law he was talking about simply doesn’t exist anymore. 
Courts in the last three decades have dismantled every per se rule applied to vertical 
conduct, limited the per se rule in horizontal conspiracies in a variety of ways, made it 
harder for plaintiffs to infer conspiracies, all but eliminated predatory-pricing claims, and 
substantially restricted the role of monopolization cases. Win rates for antitrust plaintiffs 
in at least one industry hover below 15%, and court rules make it harder and harder for 
antitrust plaintiffs to show standing to sue to enforce the laws that remain.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). We have no doubt that antitrust at one time was skewed toward over-
enforcement, but today if there is any bias it is in the opposite direction. 
 94.  Id. at 702 n.78 (“[T]he Antitrust Division has filed pro-defendant briefs in all of the major 
antitrust cases before the Supreme Court in the past five years.”). While that was true in 2009, the 
change in administration brought with it a somewhat more aggressive approach. 
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legislatures should repeal the doctrine, allowing suits by indirect purchasers. 
Alternatively, the Court could limit the reach of Illinois Brick to circumstances in 
which direct purchasers either have already filed suit or, at the very least, are 
permitted to do so. Repealing Illinois Brick only in the subset of cases in which the 
defendants actually compelled arbitration would most fully avoid the double 
compensation problem the Court identified. It would also help discourage the 
widespread use of antitrust arbitration agreements.95 
We acknowledge that shifting antitrust enforcement to indirect purchasers is a 
second-best solution96 because tracing the effect of the overcharge to indirect 
purchasers is harder than simply measuring the price charged to direct 
purchasers.97 Still, Italian Colors may have broader implications for antitrust 
standing. If the best plaintiffs are no longer available, we might permit standing 
not only by indirect purchasers, but also by competitors under circumstances in 
which we currently do not. 
We think the Italian Colors decision was probably a mistake and the best 
solution would be to overrule it. But since it is unlikely the Supreme Court will 
reverse a decision it made only one year ago,98 we proceed on the assumption that 
Italian Colors will remain the law. And if it does, repealing or limiting Illinois 
Brick will go a long way toward mitigating the harm it caused. 
 
 
 95.  For other ways to limit the effects of Italian Colors, see Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. 
Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval, __ NW. U. L. REV. __, draft at 38–43 (forthcoming 
2015). 
 96.  See Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure 
Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 267–69 (1993) (discussing the theory of the 
second best). 
 97.  Furthermore, a class action brought by indirect purchasers will necessarily have significantly 
more class members than a class action brought by direct purchasers, which can increase the agency 
costs associated with class action litigation. 
 98.  It is possible that Congress will reverse Italian Colors, but it seems unlikely. Congress has 
traditionally been very pro-arbitration, and indeed the Federal Arbitration Act has been interpreted as a 
deliberate effort by Congress to strengthen arbitration over judicial opposition. Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). Efforts to pass the proposed Arbitration Fairness 
Act, which would limit the ability of companies to impose mandatory arbitration clauses on consumers 
and expressly overrule Italian Colors, have so far failed. See generally Martin H. Malin, The 
Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 
289 (2012) (advocating for reform at least as extensive as the AFA). 
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